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Abstract
This essay raises questions about the Patent Harmonization Treaty. addressing the overall direction of
harmonization in this country and the processes that are being applied to the harmonization effort. Section I
of the essay compares the underlying goals of patent harmonization with those of the current United States
patent system. The article contends that the legal rules relating to patents in this country evidence a specific
intent to promote domestic industry. The aims of harmonization, in contrast, are fundamentally different. To
be valid, then, patent harmonization may require a basic shift in the social consensus in this country
concerning the use of patents. Section II examines the lawmaking processes that WIPO has used to arrive at
the current text of the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The essay concludes that when viewed from the
perspective of the national interests of the United States, WIPO's mechanisms have been neither careful nor
inclusive. Section III addresses the general feasibility of using legislative lawmaking methods to define the law
of patents in this country. It argues that proper efforts to legislate harmonization are likely to be difficult and
time consuming. The great majority of the current law of patents in the United States is the result of significant
common law development. Recent legislation relating to patents has shown that legislated rules of patent law
often have unintended effects. The current harmonization effort, moreover, is much more comprehensive than
any patent legislation we have attempted to date. As a result, there are substantial reasons to decline the
opportunity to design a harmonized set of patent laws through legislation.
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Essay: Patent Harmonization, 
Protectionism, and Legislation 
R. Carl Moy* 
INTRODUCfION 
Efforts have been ongoing for nearly a decade in the latest efforts to harmonize l the patent laws of the world. 2 For the United States, 
the decisional point on whether to join in that effort is drawing near. 
The Paris Union3 is in the final stages of negotiating a multilateral 
treaty that will harmonize the law of patents within signatory coun-
• Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Of Counsel, Merchant, Gould, Smith, 
Edell, Welter & Schmidt, P.A. The author would like to thank Amelia Buharin and Amy Itoku 
for their research assistance. 
1 Generally speaking, "harmonization" of legal systems refers to coordinating the various rules 
of law in the subject systems to the point where they express common, minimum principles. In 
this sense, harmonization can be contrasted with the more exacting ideal of "unification" of the 
law which, in its pristine form, refers to the use of the same legal rules in each system. See 
generally, e.g, David, Rene, The International Unification of Private Law, 2 International En-
cyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5, 34-35 (1971). 
2 The current efforts before the World Intellectual Property Organization (hereinafter "WIPO") 
to arrive a treaty on patent law harmonization began at least as early as 1983. See Note, Committee 
of Experts on the Extension of a Grace Period, 1984 Indus. Prop. 313; Kirk, M., WIPO's 
Involvement in International Developments, 50 Albany L.J. 601, 602 (1986) (hereinafter "Kirk") 
(asserting that WIPO harmonization efforts grew originally out an effort to coordinate the oper-
ations of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), the Japanese Patent Office, 
and the European Patent Office). The creation of international standards for the protection of 
patents has also been a subject in the Uruguay Round of the negotiations concerning the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). See generally, the sources cited infra, n.58. 
In broad terms, however, patent harmonization as been an objective of portions of the inter-
national patent bar since the 1870's. See 1 Ladas, S.P., Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights-
National and International Protection, 59-68 (1974) (hereinafter "Ladas"); Penrose, E., The 
Economics of the International Patent System, 42-59 (1951) (hereinafter "Penrose"). 
3 The Paris Union consists of the states that are members of the various forms of the Convention 
for the International Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"). Leaffer, M.A., 
International Treaties on Intellectual Property, at 563-64 (1990) (hereinafter "Leaffer"). The 
Paris Union has itself created WIPO to administer the Paris Convention, replacing the former 
United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property ("BIRPI") in 1967. Leaf-
fer, at 563-64; See The Convention Establishing the World Intellectunl Property Organization, 
WIPO Pub. No. 251, reprinted in Leaffer, at 566 (hereinafter "WIPO Convention"). 
777 
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tries (hereinafter the "Patent Harmonization Treaty").4 Officials of 
the United States, as well as representatives of private organizations 
based in the United States, have participated in those negotiations.5 
Legislation has been introduced in the United States that would au-
4 See Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
As Far As Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Treaty), WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3 (1990) 
(hereinafter "Basic Proposal"). For discussions of the Patent Harmonization Treaty overall, see 
generally Fiorito, E.G., Hannonization of u. S. and Worldwide Patent Laws, 73 JPTOS 83 (1991) 
(hereinafter "Fiorito"); Pagenberg, J., The WIPO Patent Hannonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 
1 (1991) (hereinafter "Pagenberg"); and Fryer III, W., Patent Law Hannonization: The Current 
Situation and Alternatives Available (pts. 1 & 2), 72 JPTOS 242, 298 (1990) (hereinafter "Fryer 
III"). WIPO itself refers to the treaty as the "Patent Law Treaty." See, e.g., id.; History of the 
Preparations of the Patent Law Treaty, WI PO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5 (1990) (hereinafter "WIPO 
History"). Those in the United States, however, have referred to it most commonly as the "Patent 
Harmonization Treaty." 
The treaty has been the subject of a series of meetings before WIPO of the "Committee of 
Experts on the Harmonization of Certain Provisions of Law for the Protection of Inventions." 
See generally WIPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, at par. 4. In general, eleven preparatory 
meetings have been held, including an initial meeting that was limited to consideration of issues 
relating to the use of a "grace period" before filing. A listing of those meetings is provided 
below, along with citations to the Notes summarizing each that have appeared in WIPO's monthly 
publication, Industrial Property: 
Prior meeting on 
grace period 
1st Session 
2nd Session 
3rd Session 
4th Session 
5th Session, 
part 1 
part 2 
1984 INDUS. PROP. 313 
1985 INDUS. PROP. 267 
1986 INDUS. PROP. 309 
1987 INDUS. PROP. 204 
1988 INDUS. PROP. 179 
1988 INDUS. PROP. 358 
1989 INDUS. PROP. 53 
6th Session 
7th Session 
8th Session, 
part 1 
part 2 
1989 INDUS. PROP. 269 
1990 INDUS. PROP. 140 
1990 INDUS. PROP. 297 
1991 INDUS. PROP. 41 
The member states of the Paris Union were to finally approve the treaty at a Diplomatic Conference 
in June 1991. At that time, however, authorities from various member states indicated that their 
governments would not approve of the treaty as it then existed. This included the United States 
insisting that it be allowed the option of retaining its first-to-invent theory of priority. See, e.g., 
Statement of the Hon. Harry Manbeck, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Joint Hearings 
on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trade-
marks and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the 
House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (here-
inafter "Statement of Manbeck"); Remarks of M. Kirk at AIPLA Spring-Stated Meeting (May 
2, 1991) reprinted in 1991 AIPLA Bull. 442, 443-46 (April-June) (hereinafter "Remarks of 
Kirk"); Bardehle, H., The WIPO Hannonization Treaty and the Grace Period, 1991 Indus. Prop. 
372 (hereinafter "Bardehle"). Final approval by the Paris Union is now awaiting "the prospect 
of reaching a compromise on the diverging positions of the Paris Union member states." Bardehle, 
1991 Indus. Prop. 372. Legislation has been introduced before the United States Congress in an 
effort to help provide such prospects. See infra, n.6. The proceedings at the diplomatic conference 
are summarized at 1991 Indus. Prop. 360. . 
5 An exact listing of the participants appears at the various WIPO meetings in the Notes 
summarizing each meeting. See supra, nA, and the text, infra, accompanying nn.86-107. 
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thorize fundamental changes in the law of patents in this country 
upon harmonization.6 Many people knowledgeable in patent law be-
lieve that harmonization is an idea whose time has come.7 
Yet, many of those interested in the United States patent system 
view harmonization with reactions that range from skepticism to hos-
tility.8 Segments as diverse as small-inventor groups9 and research 
universities lO are opposed to the concept. Former Commissioner of 
Patents and Trademarks Donald Banner has adamantly criticized some 
aspects of the harmonization effort.11 The patent bar itself is by no 
6 s. 2605, lO2d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4978, lO2d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); See 
generally, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S5226-01 (introducing S. 2605); 44 PTCJ 3 (May 7, 1992) 
(summarizing testimony at joint hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978). 
7 See, e.g., Statement of Manbeck, supra, n.4; Statement of H. Wegner, Joint Hearings on S. 
2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks 
and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House 
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (hereinafter 
"Statement of Wegner"); Statement of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, Joint 
Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and 
Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of 
the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) 
(delivered by Robert Benson) (hereinafter "Statement of the AIPLA "). 
8 Remarks of J. DeGrandi at the AIPLA Spring-Stated Meeting (May 2, 1991) reprinted in 
1991 AIPLA Bull. 645 (July-Sept.); Donald Banner, Address to the American Bar Association 
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law at its Annual Meeting (August 12, 1991) 
(references to this organization are hereinafter abbreviated as .. ABA-PTC"); George Clark, State-
ment to the ABA-PTC Annual Meeting on Resolution 102-1 (August 10, 1991), reprinted in 
ABA-PTe, 1990-91 Annual Report, at 73; Douglas Wyatt, Statement to the ABA-PTe Annual 
Meeting on Resolution 102-1 (August 10, 1991), reprinted in id. at 68; Statement of Douglas 
Wyatt, Joint Hearings on S.2605 and H.R. 4978, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial 
Administration of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, lO2d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 
30, 1992) (hereinafter "Statement of JJYatt"). 
9 See, e.g., letter from Esther S. Smith on behalf of the Association of Technology Business 
Councils to Rep. Bentley (R-Md.) (Sept. 25, 1992) (criticizing first-to-file recommendation of 
the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform); Robert Toole, President, United Inventors 
Association of the United States of America, Statement to the Technology Transfer Task Force 
of the Republican Research Committee, (Sept. 29, 1992) (same); America's Greatest Asset Under 
Siege, Invention Connection 1 (Aug. 1992) (asserting SBA study in April, 1992, to have found 
66% of small businesses to oppose a change to first-to-file priority). See also 138 Congo Rec. 
H7370-72 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Bentley). 
10 E.g., Statement of the Association of University Technology Managers, Joint Hearings on 
S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks 
and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House 
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (delivered by 
Howard Bremer) (hereinafter "Statement of the AUTM"). 
11 See, e.g., supra, n.8; Statement of Banner on Resolution 102-1 at the Annual Meeting of 
the ABA-PTe (August 10, 1991), reprinted in ABA-PTe, 1990-91 Annual Report, at 63-64. 
Commissioner Banner's concerns center on whether those who will be affected by harmonization 
have been kept adequately informed. 
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means unified in its support of harmonization,12 and even the remarks 
of key members of Congress evidence ambivalence. 13 
In support of their positions, critics of harmonization have tended 
to debate the merits of the individual proposals that appear likely to 
be part of the final Patent Harmonization Treaty. Some have criti-
cized, for example, the proposal to replace the current first-to-invent 
system of priority in the United States with one based on a first-to-
file rationale. 14 Others have argued against the introduction of prior-
user rights into the United States. 15 
This essay also raises questions about the Patent Harmonization 
Treaty. Rather than focusing on the substance of individual provi-
sions, however, it addresses the overall direction of harmonization in 
this country and the processes that are being applied to the harmo-
nization effort. Section I of the essay compares the underlying goals 
of patent harmonization with those of the current United States patent 
system. The article contends that the legal rules relating to patents in 
this country evidence a specific intent to promote domestic industry. 
The aims of harmonization, in contrast, are fundamentally different. 
To be valid, then, patent harmonization may require a basic shift in 
the social consensus in this country concerning the use of patents. 
Section II examines the lawmaking processes that WIPO has 
used to arrive at the current text of the Patent Harmonization Treaty. 
In particular, it compares the lawmaking processes of WIPO with 
12 See, e.g., Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AIPLA Bull. 442 (observing that, as of January 1991, 
"no organized support" beyond a "few individuals" was being shown in favor of adopting a 
first-to-file priority system in the U.S.). The ABA-PTC adopted several resolutions generally 
favoring harmonization at its 1992 Annual Meeting, but over strong opposition. The ABA-PTe 
recommitted other resolutions that dealt with harmonization more specifically. 
13 See, e.g., Statement of Senator DeConcini, Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee 
on Intellectual Propeny and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate Committees on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) ("Harmonization would lead to the most 
significant changes in the United States Patent Law since the Patent Act of 1836. Thus, it is my 
view that such drastic changes to fundamental aspects of our patent system should be examined 
and considered in Congress and not in a backroom meeting in Brussels or Geneva. And let me 
make this clear-in this senator's view, the burden is on those who seek to change our patent 
system. They must prove their case that change is necessary. "). 
14 E.g., Statement of the AUTM, supra, n.10; Keegan, Robert R., Re: Blake R. Wiggs Article 
"Canada's First-to-File Experience, 73 JPTOS 804 (1991) (letter to the editor); Katona, Gabriel, 
First-to-File-Not in the United States, 73 JPTOS 399 (1991); Macedo, Charles R.B., First to 
File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard Worth the Price?, 1988 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 543 (1988). 
15 E.g., Statement of Wyatt, supra, n.8; Statement of the AUTM, supra, n.lO. Cf. Brownlee, 
L.M., Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law Harmoni-
zation: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 JPTOS 523 (1990) (suggesting changes to treaty provision). 
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those that the American Law Institute (the" ALI") has used recently 
to restate the law of trademarks. The ALI's mechanisms have been 
careful and inclusive. The essay concludes, however, that when viewed 
from the perspective of the national interests of the United States, 
WIPO's mechanisms have not. It is likely, therefore, that the terms 
of the Patent Harmonization Treaty do not reflect the full expertise 
of the legal community of the United States. It is also possible that 
the substance of the Patent Harmonization Treaty has in fact wandered 
away from the social consensus that exists in the United States for 
it. 
Section III addresses the general feasibility of using legislative 
lawmaking methods to define the law of patents in this country. Even 
if the processes of WIPO are unacceptable, it does not necessarily 
follow that the United States cannot attain patent harmonization via 
some other lawmaking method. We have legislated statutory schemes 
to govern other complex areas of law, and it is therefore at least 
theoretically possible that we could make patent law succumb to 
similar efforts. Section III of the article, however, argues that proper 
efforts to legislate harmonization are likely to be difficult and time 
consuming. The great majority of the current law of patents in the 
United States is the result of significant common law development. 
Recent legislation relating to patents has shown that legislated rules 
of patent law often have unintended effects. The current harmoni-
zation effort, moreover, is much more comprehensive than any patent 
legislation we have attempted to date. As a result, there are substantial 
reasons to decline the opportunity to design a harmonized set of patent 
laws through legislation. 
I. HARMONIZATION VS. PROTECfIONISM 
The broad goal of patent harmonization is to produce a set of 
patent laws in various countries that are substantially uniform, to 
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thereby facilitate the trans-national assertion of patent rights. 16 Har-
monization thus reflects the implicit decision to approach competitive 
inventive activity in a manner that disregards the national origin of 
the inventorY It is assumed that such a free-trade, "level playing 
field" condition will optimize the pace of technological development 
worldwide, or at least operate to the net benefit of U.S. inventive 
entities. 18 
Comparing these goals and assumptions of harmonization to the 
present U.S. patent system creates fundamental difficulties. Patent 
systems, including the patent system of the United States, are mech-
16 See, e.g., WIPO Convention, Art. 3, 4 (1967), Leaffer, at 567: 
Article 3 
Objectives of the Organization 
The objectives of the Organization are: 
(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States .•.. 
Article 4 
Functions 
In order to attain the objectives described in Article 3, the Organization, through its appropriate organs, and 
subject to the competence of each of the Unions: 
(i) shall promote the development of measures designed to facilitate the efficient protection of intellectual 
property throughout the world and to harmonize national legislation in this field[.] 
See also WIPO, Report on the Work of Main Committee V (World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization), in Reports on the Work of the Five Main Committees of the Intellectual Property 
Conference of Stockholm, 1967, WIPO Doc. No. 309(E), at 123, 128-29 (1967) (hereinafter 
"Report on the Work of Main Committee V"). See generally, e.g., 1 Ladas, at 13 (observing 
that "unification and harmonization of the law of industrial property on a worldwide basis" is 
hoped to "lead to automatic world recognition of rights of industrial property"); Penrose, at ch. 
3 (discussing history of the Paris Convention); Ulmer, E., Copyright and Industrial Property, 14 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 1, 10 (1987) (hereinafter "Ulmer"). 
17 Article 2 of the Paris Convention, for example, requires that each member country provide 
nationals of any member country with the same rights that the country gives to its own nationals. 
See generally Leaffer, at 7-8; 1 Ladas, at 283. The Patent Harmonization Treaty can be viewed 
as an effort to carry this general rationale into further specifics, as well as to require more rigorous 
minimum standards of protection than the Paris Convention currently provides for. 
18 See Simon, E., U.S. Trade Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, 50 Albany L.J. 501 
(1986) (hereinafter "Simon"); Remarks of Emory Simon at the Symposium on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property, March 24-25, 1989, reprinted in 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 367 
(1989). Simon refers to a "white paper" issued by the Administration in 1985 that reportedly 
detailed the Administration's objectives with regard to international negotiations on intellectual 
property. 50 Albany L.J. at 502-03, 506-07. The Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
however, has been unable to locate copies of the document in response to inquiries from the 
author's staff. 
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an isms to increase wealth. 19 They encourage the disclosure of new 
technology,20 thereby fostering the creation of wealth in the form of 
publicly available information. They also spur increased inventive 
activity, thereby increasing wealth in the form of industrial know-
how even apart from the disclosure function. 21 
Viewed more specifically, the U.S. patent system is focused 
narrowly on increasing the national wealth of the United States.22 
The United States patent system does not ask whether inventions are 
new worldwide. Instead, it limits anticipating prior knowledge, use 
19 E.g., Heald, Paul, Federal Intellectual Propeny and the Economics of Preemption, 76 Iowa 
L.J. 959, 962 (1991). See, e.g., Abramson, The Patent System: Its Economic and Social Basis, 
Patent Study No. 26 of the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the Committee 
on the Judicial)' of the United States Sen., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1958) (reports in this set are 
hereinafter referred to individually as "Patent Study No. ") ("[I]t will be in society's interest 
to assure, at a minimum, the supply of any invention whose costs of creation can be recovered 
through savings made possible in manufacture, or through the profitable sale of a new product."). 
At one time, patent systems were also justified as a means of recognizing the inventor's property 
interest, or "natural right," in his or her invention. That rationale, however, was largely discarded 
in the nineteenth centul)'. See Ma1chup & Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth 
Century, 10 J. Econ. Hist. 1 (1950) (hereinafter "Ma1chup & Penrose"). 
20 E.g., Patent Study No. 26 at 5; Vaughan, F.L., The United States Patent System, 27·29 
(1977) (hereinafter "Vaughan"); Penrose, at 31·34; Ma1chup, F., An Economic Review of the 
Patent System, Patent Study No. 15, 21·24 (1958). 
21 E.g., Patent Study No. 26, at 5; Vaughan, at 29·32; Vernon, The International Patent 
System and Foreign Policy, Patent Study No.5, 6 (1957) ("The underlying economic assumption 
in the grant of patent monopolies by the government to their own nationals is that the monopoly 
is essential to the stimulation of invention or investment; and that the stimulation afforded by the 
grant contributes more to the well.being of the nation than the inherent cost of the monopoly. "); 
Patent Study No. 15, at 59·62 (asserting that role of patent system is to encourage creation of 
inventions whose value exceeds their social cost); Kaufer, E. The Economics of the Patent System, 
19 (1989) (hereinafter "Kaufer"); Penrose, at 34·4l. 
22 Cf. Patent Study No.5, at 6 ("The institution of the patent grant was originally de· 
vised ... partly as a device for stimulating domestic industry. "); Patent Study No. 15, at 17; 
Penrose, at 88·89; and the sources cited infra, nn.23·43. The same function has been asserted to 
be a basis of trade secret law. Fetterley, D., Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating 
to the Theft of Trade Secrets, Bus. Lawyer 1535 (1970). 
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or sale to acts that have occurred "in this country."23 This is because 
introducing new information into the United States increases the na-
tional wealth of this country, even though the information may al-
ready be known elsewhere. United States patent law therefore rewards 
conduct of this latter type, despite the fact that the U.S. patentee, 
strictly speaking, is not the first inventor of the patented advance. 24 
This focus on information available within the United States 
leads to another important, corollary aspect of the United States patent 
system. Logically, if enriching the United States is the meaningful 
act that the patent system seeks to encourage, then the inventor who 
first brings the patentable advance to the United States should have 
the superior claim in a priority contest. Consistent with this aim, the 
23 Sections 102(a) and (b) of Title 35, U.S.C. provide: 
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless-
(a) the invention was known or used in this country . .. before the invention thereof by the applicant. 
(b) the invention was •.. in public use or on sale in this country . .. more than one year before the date of 
application for patent in the United States[.] 
(emphasis added). In this respect the patent law of the United States differs notably from the 
patent laws of numerous other countries, which disregard the geographic location of public uses 
and sales for the purpose of determining novelty. See generally President's Commission on the 
Patent System, "To Promote the Progress of. . . the Useful Arts" in an Age of Exploding Tech-
nology, (1966). 
The fact that publications outside the United States also qualify as anticipating disclosures can 
be explained via assumptions about the larger availability of such information to United States 
nationals, rather than any focus on the worldwide nature of the advance sought to be patented. 
See, e.g., Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850) ("If the foreign invention had been printed 
or published, it was already given to the world and open to the people of this country, as well 
of by others, upon reasonable inquiry .... But if the foreign discovery is not patented, nor 
described in any printed publication, it might be known and used in remote places for ages, and 
the people of this country be unable to profit by it.") See generally 1 Chisum, Patents, § 3.05[5] 
(1992). 
24 The assertion is an inherent result of disregarding foreign knowledge and use for purposes 
of determining novelty and nonobviousness. See, e.g., sections 102(a), (b). Current discussions 
of the territorial restrictions in these sections tend to focus on the practical problems that arise 
when trying to prove activities outside the United States. It appears clear, however, that at the 
time the United States adopted the restrictions this concern was subservient to the motivation 
discussed in the main text. 
As a closely related example, it was possible until the British Patent Act of 1977 to patent an 
invention in the United Kingdom on its first introduction into that country from abroad, even 
though the "introducer" derived the invention from another. See Chartered Institute of Patent 
Agents, C.I.P .A. Guide to the Patents Acts, §7.07 (1990); Armitage, Edward, Patents: Recent 
Developments and Future Prospects on the National Level in the United Kingdom, in Current 
Trends in the Field of Intellectual Property, 103, 107 (1971); Patent Study No. 15, at 7 n.33. 
Evidence indicates that the practice was of ancient lineage, see Bugbee, B.W., The Genesis of 
American Patent and Copyright Law (1967) (hereinafter "Bugbee"), and that many countries 
once granted such "patents of importation." 
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United States patent law prohibits inventors from proving dates of 
invention on the basis of activities that have been performed outside 
the United States.25 Far from being historical anachronisms, the ter-
ritorial restrictions in Chapter 10 of the patent code26 are outgrowths 
of a fundamental purpose of the United States patent system.27 
In addition, patent systems promote national wealth in another 
way that has more direct implications for patent harmonization. Pa-
tents stimulate inventive activity by promising to transfer more wealth 
from consumers of the patented advance to the patent owner than 
25 Section 102(g) provides: 
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless-
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another .••• 
(emphasis added). 
Section 104 provides: 
§ 104. Inventions made abroad 
In proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office and in the courts, an applicant for a patent, or a patentee, 
may not establish a date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with respect 
thereto, in a foreign country, except as provided in sections 119 and 365 of this title [implementing the Paris 
Convention and Patent Cooperation Treaties]. 
(emphasis added). Section 102(a) can be regarded as a first-to-invent section whose territorial 
restrictions are consistent with the point made here in the text_ 
It can be argued that symmetry concerns and the focus in Sections 102(a) and 102(b) on acts 
"in this country" compel the territorial restrictions in sections 102(g) and 104. While the proof 
is somewhat too involved to present here in full detail, interested readers can find the matter 
discussed in some detail in Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U_S. 5 (1939); Cham-
bers v. Duncan, 1876 C.D. 82 (Comm'r_ Pat.); and 3 Chisum. Patents x 10.03[3]. 
It should be noted that the current proposal of the United States. which involves retaining a 
first-to-invent system of priority, see supra, n.4. offers instead to remove the territorial restrictions 
in section 104 and change the Hilmer rule. discussed infra, at nn.27. 39. See WI PO Doc. No. 
PLT/DC/6 (proposal by United States); Remarks of Kirk. 1991 AIPLA Bull. 442 (discussing 
substance of proposal). 
26 Chapter 10 of Title 35. U.S.C .• consists of sections 100-105_ 
27 There are, of course. various provisions in the patent laws of the United States that allow 
foreign inventors to rely on the filing of certain non-U.S. patent applications for priority. E.g., 
35 U.S.C_ §§ 102(e). 104. 119. The provisions were added to implement the Paris Convention 
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. They are. however, essentially layered over the basic structure 
of the U .S_ patent system and have not forced the United States to change the national focus of 
its patent laws. See generally 4 Chisum. Patents. § 14.02[3]. (The rule embodied in section 104 
of the patent code, for example, was created after the United States implemented the Paris 
Convention. See Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5 (1939); and Section 9 of 
the Patent Act of August 8, 1946, Ch. 910, Pub. L. No. 690, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 Stat. 
640 (enacting predecessor of section 104).) The fact that these foreign-priority provisions proceed 
from a different theoretical basis may explain why they coexist with the rest of United States 
patent law uncomfortably. See, e.g., In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (CCPA 1966) and In re Hilmer, 
424 F.2d 1108 (CCPA 1970) (holding that foreign priority date has no effect for prior art pur-
poses); 1 Ladas, at 304-06 (asserting that holdings of the Hilmer decisions "conflict" with Article 
4 of the Paris Convention). 
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would be the case in an open market. 28 Thus, when the patent owner 
is a foreign entity, the patent increases the outflow of wealth from 
the patenting country. 29 When the patent owner is a domestic en-
tity,conversely, the increased market power that the patent confers 
over foreign competitors may stem an outflow of wealth that would 
28 E.g., Patent Study No. 26, at 7 ("[P]atentees ... enjoy a degree of monopoly power . 
. . . Production by any monopolist is likely to be at a lower level, and his prices higher, than 
would prevail if the industry were competitive."); Patent Study No. 15, at 44 (asserting that 
patent owners ultimate collect their quasi-rents from consumers as part of the price paid for goods 
and services). See, e.g., Posner, R., Economic Analysis of law, 195-99 (2d ed. 1977) (asserting 
that single producer, such as a patent holder, will maximize profits at a selling price that is higher 
than would exist in competitive market); Kitch, E.W., The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265. 266-67 (1977) ("Offsetting [the incentive] benefit of the patent 
system is the fact that the patent subjects new technology to exclusive control and, assuming that 
the demand curve for the technology has a negative slope, adversely affects social welfare, ceteris 
paribus. "). 
29 Patent Study No. 15, at 55 (asserting that foreign holdings of domestic patents act as 
"deductions from national wealth"); Penrose, at 95·96. See, e.g., Vaughan, at 259-60 ("Our 
laws allow foreigners to take out patents in this country merely for the purpose of reserving the 
United States as a market for their patented products; the result in some instances is the prevention 
of manufacture in this country in spite of more favorable factors of production here than abroad. 
The only benefit arising here comes mainly from the importation of such inventions or the products 
they make possible .... "). Cf Patent Study No.5, at 4 (observing that providing rights to 
foreign patentees raises concern of undue control of domestic economy, and asserting that the 
United States was previously able to ignore such concerns due to the low percentage of foreign 
nationals who held U.S. patents at the time). 
Some commentators have considered patents to be analogous to tariffs as barriers to trade. 
E.g., Simon, 50 Albany L.J. 501. The implication is apparently that the same economic calcu-
lations that support the decision to seek low tariffs should also support the decision to favor open 
transnational patenting. Others, however, have described the analogy between tariffs and patents 
as "not entirely apt." Patent Study No. 26 at 13. For example, reducing tariffs has the positive 
effect of lowering costs of the affected goods to domestic consumers, which tends to offset the 
harm that the lower tariff inflicts on the inefficient domestic producers who the tariff previously 
protected. In comparison, allowing foreigners increased access to domestic patents does not benefit 
domestic consumers significantly-foreign patenting merely places single-source control of the 
patented good into the hands of a supplier that is foreign. Absent the increased access, the good 
would be either unpatented or controlled by a domestic patent holder. It appears likely, then, that 
a separate set of economic calculations would be required to support the decision to favor open 
transnational patenting. 
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otherwise occur. Under this rationale there are substantial reasons to 
favor nationals over foreigners in the patenting process.30 
Comparing first-to-invent priority with priority based on first-
to-file demonstrates how these concerns exist in the patent system of 
the United States today. Supporters of harmonization have advocated 
first-to-file priority over the present rationale of first-to-invent31 be-
cause of alleged administrative efficiencies.32 They have also argued 
that first-to-file priority will reward more directly the attempt to dis-
close the patented advance, thus arguably increasing the efficiency 
with which the patent system will increase wealth.33 
30 See, e.g., Penrose, at 112-127 ("[P]urely from the standpoint of its own economic benefit, 
a single country could conclude that it had nothing to gain and much to lose by including foreign 
inventions within the protection of its patent law, providing that the direct gain from granting 
foreign patents was the only consideration. "); Patent Study No.5, at 6 (" [I]t does not follow 
[from the general economic assumptions that favor patents] that the extension of patent rights by 
nations to foreigners has the same general effect upon inventiveness or the disclosure of inventions 
as those granted to nationals; .. .it is easy to envisage cases in which the issuance of a foreign 
patent may have no effect on inventiveness or public information regarding inventions. "); Patent 
Study No. 15, at 12. 
The same analysis can lead to the conclusion that no patent system, or perhaps only a weak 
patent system, is preferable where conditions suggest that foreigners will hold significant portions 
of a country's patents. Switzerland denied patent protection to chemical processes during the 19th 
century, for example, when it appeared that the owners of Swiss patents on such subject matter 
would be German, rather than Swiss corporations. E.g., Kaufer, at 10; Penrose, at 16-17, 120-
24. China announced its adherence to the same general strategy in the 1980's. Kaufer, at 48. 
This may explain the general hostility of developing countries to the protection of intellectual 
property. See, e.g., 1 Ladas, at 13; Penrose, at 115-17; Braga, C., The Economics of Intellectual 
Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 243 (1989); 
Berkowitz and Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy, 15 Can. J. Econ. 1 (1982). For 
discussions of specific examples of such arguable hostility, see, e.g., Fiorito, E.G., 73 JPTOS 
83, 89-91 (1991) (discussing proposal by developing countries to allow limits on fields of tech-
nology that are patentable); Kaufer, at 13, 51 (discussing attempt by developing countries in early 
1980's to allow the grant of exclusive compulsory licenses); See generally, e.g., Patent Study 
No.5, at 12-13 (discussing economic rationale); Kaufer, at 47-48 (same); Greer, D., The Case 
Against the Patent System in Less Developed Countries, 8 Int'\. J. of L. & Econ. 223 (1973) 
(hereinafter "Greer"); Note, The Role of the Patent System in technology Transfer: The Japanese 
Experience, 26 Colum. 1. Transnat'\' L. (1987). 
The analysis in the text, of course, is not complete. The promise of an increased pace of 
technological advance generally, or the threat of retaliatory trade practices by countries whose 
inventors are disadvantaged, may make a strong patent system worthwhile even at the cost of 
enriching foreign patent holders. 
31 The United States law of first-to-invent is embodied essentially in sections 102(a), 102(e) 
and 102(g). 
32 E.g., Wiggs, Blake Rd., Canada's First·to-File Experience-Should the U.S. Make the 
Move?, 73 JPTOS 493, 502-03 (1991) (hereinafter "Wiggs"); Wrenn, Gregory J., What Should 
be Our Priority-Protection for the First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 JPTOS 872, 878-80 
(1990) (hereinafter "Wrenn"); Dunner, Donald R., First to File: Should Our Interference System 
be Abolished?, 68 JPTOS 561, 562-63 (1986). These sources are representative of a much larger 
literature. 
33 E.g., Wiggs, 73 JPTOS at 507-09; Wrenn, 72 JPTOS at 883-85. 
HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 788 1992
788 R. Carl Moy JPTOS 
The difficulty with these assertions is that they analyze the effect 
of the two competing priority rationales on situations where the patent 
applicants are domestic entities. They igriore, therefore, the differ-
ences in the transnational effects of the two rationales-effects that 
are significant and perhaps even dominant. 34 Specifically, awarding 
priority under the United States' current first-ta-invent rationale, when 
coupled with the provisions that restrict proof of invention to the 
United States,35 effectively advantages domestic inventors over for-
eign nationals in the contest to obtain United States patents.36 Award-
ing priority under a first-to-file rationale does not, in contrast, 
particularly if one allows foreign applicants to establish priority by 
filing national applications in their own countries.37 The advantage 
that United States inventors currently enjoy under first-to-invent, 
moreover, is extremely one-sided, in that foreign patent systems al-
ready determine priority on the basis of filing date,38 a contest in 
which United States inventors can compete evenly.39 
The effect of United States patent law to disadvantage foreign 
inventors, in fact, is even more clear when viewed historically. The 
United States for a time required that foreign patentees work their 
34 Wiggs, for example, does not treat the transnational effects of the two competing priority 
rationales, despite identifying no less than twenty seven arguments that favor a first-to-invent 
system. 
35 See supra, n.25. 
36 See, e.g., International Federation of Industrial Property Counsel, FlCPI Position Paper 
for the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention 
as Far as Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Hannonization Treaty), at 1-2 (May 6, 1991) 
(hereinafter "FICPI Position Paper") (discussing result as "geographical imbalance" in favor 
of domestic inventors). 
37 Article 4 of the Paris Convention requires that foreign inventors be allowed to establish 
priority on the basis of foreign filings that meet certain specified criteria. Leaffer, at 21-23. 
38 Article 60(2) of the European Patent Convention (hereinafter the "EPC"), reprinted in 
Leaffer, at 144, 166, for example, awards patent rights to the inventor whose "application has 
the earliest date of filing." Article 87 of the EPC accords a foreign-filed application with priority 
under the Paris Convention. Leaffer, at 175-76. 
39 Not coincidentally, a shift in the priority rules of the United States from a first-to-invent to 
a first-to-file rationale has been a major objective of foreign interests in the WIPO meetings. See, 
e.g., Report of the Third Meeting of the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, at 17-18 
(on file with the PTO) (reporting evaluation by the PTO that "without this concession [on U.S. 
priority) the U.S. will have very little leverage" in the WIPO negotiations). Certain foreign 
delegations are willing to accept the United States' alternate proposal to retain first-to-invent 
priority but permit priority based on foreign activities, as discussed supra, n.25, see FlCPI 
Position Paper, at 1-2; Remarks of Bardehle at the Spring-Stated Meeting of the AIPLA (May 
2,1991), 1991 AIPLA Bull. 633, 636 (July-Sept.), apparently because either change will seriously 
weaken the bias of the current United States patent system toward domestic inventors. 
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patented inventions in the United States as a condition of protection.4O 
No such requirement applied to domestic patentees.41 For a time the 
United States even denied foreign inventors the right to obtain United 
States patents altogether. 42 
With this background, the conflict between harmonization and 
the present United States patent system is clear. The United States 
patent system has never been a means of fostering free trade-rather, 
it is a set of measures whose effects are substantially protectionist. 43 
The globalist aims of patent harmonization may therefore be incon-
sistent with the underlying assumptions upon which the current United 
States patent system is based. 
The point of this observation is not that economic decisions made 
in the 19th century should bind the United States immutably today, 
or even that harmonization is wrong on its merits. Instead, the lesson 
is a narrower one: the simple existence of the present United States 
patent system does not imply a mandate to harmonize. Stated another 
way, perfecting the present United States patent system may mean 
making it more effectively protectionist, not less so as is the goal of 
harmonization. 
This lesson is enormously important in terms of legal process. 
The law should change only in response to the formation of an ap-
propriate social consensus. In the case of patent harmonization this 
means first resolving to adopt a globalist, free-trade approach to in-
40 Section 15 of the Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, made it a defense to an action 
for patent infringement if 
Ihe palenlee, if an alien at the dme the patent was granted, had failed and neglecled for the space of eighleen 
months from Ihe dale of Ihe palenl, 10 pUI and conlinue on sale 10 Ihe public, on reasonable lerms, Ihe invenlion 
or discovery for which Ihe palenl issued. 
(emphasis added). The provision remained in force until 1870. See generally 2 Robinson, 
Patents for Inventions, § 632 (1890). Vernon discusses the general history of working requirements 
in Patent Study No.5, at 3, 7, and asserts that the function of such requirements is to favor the 
stimulation of domestic industry in the face of patenting by foreigners. Accord, Penrose, at 78-
87, 137-61; Patent Study No. 15, at 17 n.92. 
41 Section 15 of the Patent Act of 1836. 
42 Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, permitted U.S. patents to be 
issued only to .. a citizen or citizens of the United States." This provision was replaced by Section 
1 of the Patent Act of 1800, which allowed aliens to take out U.S. patents provided that they had 
been resident in the United States for the previous two years. See generally Philips, The Law of 
Patents for Inventions, Ch. VI, § 7 (1837). The Patent Act of July 13, 1832 expanded this to any 
alien who declared an intention to become a citizen of the United States. This last provision 
remained in force until superceded by Section 15 of the Act of 1836, as discussed in the two 
immediately preceeding footnotes. 
43 Indeed, patent systems worldwide have been viewed as protectionist mechanisms at odds 
with free trade. E.g., Kaufer, at 8-10; Malchup & Penrose, 10 J. Econ; Hist. at 4-10. See infra, 
n.137. 
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novation and patenting, with all of its risks and potential advantages. 
The United States has not been operating according to that consensus 
to date; indeed, it is possible that we have been operating under an 
opposite one. Large exporting corporations that are heavily invested 
in research and development may prosper from a level international 
playing field. 44 Whether the United States as a whole will be better 
off, however, is at least a different question.45 
Perhaps, then, part of the unease over harmonization involves a 
reluctance to make such fundamental and far-reaching changes in our 
approach to protecting United States technology. If that is so, per-
suading the critics of harmonization will require us to confront much 
more basic value judgments than we have been discussing up to now. 
The United States is the largest consumer market in the world,46 and 
we are net consumers, rather than producers, of goods and services.47 
Patent harmonization in the form currently under consideration may 
simply not be in our national interest. 48 
44 E.g., Penrose, at 126 ("The fact is that the immediate gain to exporting firms of all 
industrialized countries is so evident that strong pressures would in any case come from them [if 
no international patent system were present] in favor of a regime in which patents can be obtained 
in foreign countries. "). 
45 See, e.g., Patent Study No.5, at 12 ("A nation considering whether and on what terms to 
grant patents to foreigners has some exceedingly complicated economic judgments to make. "); 
1 Ladas, at 15 ("[H]armonization has to be viewed realistically. The trend toward viewing 
'harmonization' as a good thing no matter what the problems are, as an end in itself, is subject 
to a fair degree of qualification. In certain areas it may be simply undesirable or impractical from 
a country's national point of view, since the concessions that would have to be made to achieve 
agreement may not be worth it. "). 
46 Current estimates rank the United States as consuming 30-35% of the world's goods and 
services. The United States is thus the world's largest single consumer market, pending the 
European Community'S adoption of structural changes in 1993. 
47 E.g., Economic Report of the President, H.R. Doc. No. 177, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 416 
(1992) (reporting 1990 trade deficit of $123.4 billion). Penrose asserts that a country's gain from 
the transnational flow of wealth due to foreign patenting "is especially important for the large 
exporting countries, who export more patented products than they import; in general the gain is 
obtained at the expense of the importing countries." Penrose, at 95. Vernon analyzes balance· 
of·trade figures more specifically as to nonfood manufactured products, on the assumption that 
patent protection will be limited largely to these categories of imports and exports. Patent Study 
No.5, at 7-8. 
48 See, e.g., Penrose, at 111 ("In balancing the costs and gains of extending patent protection 
to non-resident foreigners without imposing special restrictions and obligations, most countries 
have considered that the costs exceed the gains."); id. at 125 ("[Elven for [larger industrialized 
countries] the balance of costs and gains [from an international regime sanctioning foreign patents] 
does not clearly show a net gain. "). 
In light of the discussion supra, nn.34-39, this may be particularly true with regard to the 
decision whether to adopt first-to·file priority. See Penrose, at 114 ("It seems clear ... that if the 
firms in a country could obtain patents abroad regardless of whether foreigners were granted 
patents in their country, few countries would find it to their advantage to grant patents on foreign 
inventions .... "). 
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This focus on harmonization vs. protectionism can shed new 
light on other provisions that are at issue in harmonization. For ex-
ample, the grace-period provisions that the United States is seeking 
to insert in the laws of foreign countries as a part of harmonization 
would be applied without regard to national origin.49 Foreign patent 
systems that do not have a grace period, however, already apply the 
concept of absolute novelty evenly to both national and foreign in-
ventors.50 The presence or absence of a grace period outside the 
United States therefore has a largely neutral effect on the relative 
national interests of the United States and other countriesY The gains 
to the United States from inserting grace periods into the national 
patent systems of foreign countries thus may not compensate ade-
49 Basic Proposal, Art. 12, WIPO Doc. No. PLTIDC/3, at 22-23 ("Disclosures Not Affecting 
Patentability (Grace Period)"). See generally Pagenberg, 19 AIPLA Q.J. at 8-9. 
50 The Strassbourg Convention and the EPC, for example, both consider an invention old if 
it forms "part of the state of the art." Each defines the state of the art to comprise "everything 
made available to the public," with no qualification as to location. Strassbourg Convention on 
the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions, Nov. 27, 1963, 
art. 4, reprinted in Jacob, A.J., Patents Throughout the World, app. C5 (1992) (hereinafter 
"Jacob"); European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 54, reprinted in Leaffer, at 143, 164. 
In effect then, United States inventors who seek patents in foreign countries currently have at 
least one disadvantage in comparison to foreign inventors who seek United States patents. Such 
United States inventors must confront their own public disclosures as prior art, regardless of the 
geographic location of the disclosure. Foreign inventors seeking United States patents, in contrast, 
need only confront their public uses and sales as anticipations if those event occurred in this 
country. See supra, n.23. This same consideration offsets to some degree the advantage that 
United States inventors enjoy domestically under section 104. See supra, n.25. 
51 The international imposition of a facially neutral grace period provision may affect the 
national interests of certain countries. The use of a grace period advantages those who originate 
public disclosures of new technology, at the expense of those who receive such disclosures. 
Particular countries in which the former activity predominates over the latter, i. e. , those countries 
that tend to be "leaders" in new technology, arguably stand to benefit over countries that tend 
to be followers. This mechanism may explain, for example, the disagreement between Germany 
and other countries in Europe over the grace period provisions in the Patent Harmonization Treaty. 
See generally Bardehle, 1991 Indus. Prop. at 372. 
It would appear to be difficult to rely on this mechanism to guide the formation of policy, 
however. For example, the effects of this mechanism depend on economic conditions that pre-
sumably will change in a given country over time, thus possibly causing what was a net benefit 
to become a net cost. Originators of new technology may curtail their public disclosures if the 
protection of a grace period is absent. In addition, the imposition of a grace period may affect 
various segments within a given country unequally. Specifically, a grace period will naturally 
favor those entities that possess leading technology. See infra, n.l06. 
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quately for the proposed change in the United States to first-to-file 
priority. 52 
Prior-user rights provide another example. Current proposals have 
the United Stated adopting prior-user rights only as part of a har-
monization package.53 Prior-user rights, however, shift economic re-
turns away from the patent owner to the prior user. 54 They would 
exist in favor of United States nationals primarily, inasmuch as they 
are created only by domestic efforts to commercialize. 55 Current sta-
tistics show, at the same time, that a substantial percentage of United 
States patentees are foreign entities. 56 Adopting prior-user rights in 
the United States will therefore shift economic returns from a category 
52 This analysis suggests that the eagerness of some countries for harmonization may not be 
a source of comfort to the U.S. From a nationalistic viewpoint, the costs and benefits of har-
monization may appear quite different to those outside the U.S. See, e.g., FICPI Position Paper, 
at 1 (describing the elimination from United States patent law of "bias in favour of residents of 
the U.S." as "[aln attractive result of universal acceptance" of the treaty); Penrose, at 117-18, 
125 (arguing that availability of foreign patent protection is more important to smaller, rather 
than larger industrialized countries due to the lack of a domestic market of sufficient size to yield 
adequate profits). 
53 E.g., Basic Proposal, art. 20, W1PO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3, at 41 ("Prior User"); s. 2605, 
§ 3(b) (adding new section 273, entitled "Rights based on prior use," to Title 35, U.S.C.). Both 
these documents also contain provisions that would install a first-to-file rationale of priority. 
54 In general, the term "prior user" refers to one who has begun to utilize a technological 
advance prior to some significant event in the process of another person obtaining patent rights 
over the advance. The potential prior user's status can be judged, for example, as of the date the 
patent owner's application is filed, published, or issued. Some have argued that prior user rights 
can be determined as of the patent owner's date of invention. Persons who qualify as prior users 
generally obtain limited rights to continue using the patented advance during the term of the 
patent, regardless of whether the patent owner consents. See generally 1988 Group Reports of 
the Association Intemationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Industrielle [AIPPI1, no. V 
(question 89D-prior use). 
55 The Patent Harmonization Treaty calls for prior-users rights based upon use "within the 
territory where the patent produces its effect." Basic Proposal, art. 20(1), WIPO Doc. No. PLT/ 
DC/3, at 41. The pending legislation before Congress would grant prior-user rights only to those 
whose use was "in the United States." E.g., S. 2605, § 3(b) (proposing new 35 U.S.C. § 
273(a». This national focus corresponds to nearly identical provisions in the national laws of 
other countries. E.g., German Patent Act of December 16, 1980, § 12(1), translation reprinted 
in Beier, F.K., German Industrial Property, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 6 IIC Studies 14, 17 
(1983). 
56 USPTO, Patents Issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce 
News Release No. 92-1 (Feb. 14, 1992) (reporting that residents of foreign countries obtained 
45% of the United States patents issued in 1991). See also Kaufer, at 16 (discussing steep rise 
in foreign ownership of U.S. patents over time). In Japan, in contrast, the percentage of patents 
owned by foreign nationals actually decreased by nearly half from 1967 to 1980. Kaufer, at 17. 
Recent evidence suggests that trend toward increasing foreign patenting in the United States may 
have reversed. Buderi, R., Global Innovation: Who's in the Lead, Business Week, August 3, 
1992, at 68. 
For discussions of the effect of increasing domestic patenting by foreigners on domestic patent 
policy decisions, see generally, e.g., Patent Study No.5, at 4; Greer, 8 J. of Int'1. L. & Econ., 
at 228-30. 
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of persons with a substantial foreign character to one with an almost 
entirely United States character. Perfecting the present United States 
patent system according the present consensus might therefore in-
volve adopting prior-user rights independent of any change in the 
basis of priority. 
II. THE WIPO NEGOTIATIONS 
Until the recent introduction of legislation before Conress,s7.the 
United States has addressed harmonization largely through multilat-
eral negotiations before WIPO.58 Those negotiations have been wide 
ranging and comprehensive.59 At the same time, limited numbers of 
persons have participated in them on behalf of the U.S.60 
In reality, then, the WIPO negotiations have combined some of 
the worst features of both the common-law and legislative systems 
of lawmaking. The harmonization effort is addressing essentially the 
whole law of patents simultaneously, divorced from any particular 
factual setting. It therefore carries with it few of the guarantees of 
quality that stem from the incremental, gradual lawmaking that is 
characteristic of case-law development. 61 At the same time, this cost 
has not been associated with an important, offsetting benefit of leg-
islative efforts: representative participation in and control over the 
lawmaking effort. 62 Thus, there are substantial reasons to view the 
harmonization lawmaking efforts within WIPO skeptically. 
Comparing the patent harmonization effort with the recent effort 
of the American Law Institute to restate the American law of unfair 
57 See supra, n.6. 
58 International standards for the protection of intellectual property have also been discussed 
in both the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of the GAlT negotiations. See generally, e.g., Richards, 
John, Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues (TRIPS), 72 JPTOS 906 (1990) (hereinafter 
"Richards"); Stamm, O.A., GATT Negotiations for the Protection of New Technologies, 73 
JPTOS 680 (1991); Symposium, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, pts. 1 & 2, 22 
Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 223, 689 (1989); Beier, F.K. and Schricker, G., Gatt or WIPO? New 
Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, 11 IIC Studies (1991). The GAlT 
negotiations are currently at an impasse. 
59 The treaty addresses, for example, such substantive matters as the criteria for validity and 
infringement, as well as remedies. In addition, it also addresses such questions as examination 
procedures and unity of invention. 
60 See the text infra, at nn.86-105. 
61 See, e.g., Llewellyn, Karl N., The Case Law System in America, 14-16 (1989) (translation 
of German-language edition of 1933); Cardozo, Benjamin, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
29-31 (1921). 
62 See, e.g., Pound, R., Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383,403-07 (1908); 
Cappelletii, Mauro, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective, 40-46 (1989) (discussing 
criticism that common law is "undemocratic"). 
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competition illustrates these points. The ALI is a private, nonprofit 
organization that exists for the purpose of "promot[ing] the clarifi-
cation and simplification of the law. "63 As part of its work, it has 
written and published the various volumes of the First and Second 
Restatements of the Law. It is currently preparing the Third Restate-
ment of the Law, which includes for the first time a separate work 
on the law of unfair competition, including trademarks (hereinafter 
the "Restatement of Unfair Competition").64 
The WIPO negotiations are different from the ALI's restatement 
efforts in at least two fundamental ways. First, the Restatement of 
Unfair Competition is a far more modest exercise in lawmaking than 
is the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The ALI's Restatements articu-
late existing law. Typically, they either describe settled law or choose 
between alternative legal rules where there is a split of authority. 65 
The Restatements therefore map a landscape of legal rules whose 
contours are already largely understood. The WI PO negotiations, in 
contrast, are designing a new law of patents. The WIPO negotiations, 
in contrast, are designing a new law of patents. The United States 
has never operated under many of the legal rules that the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty prescribes. We are therefore not selecting be-
63 Certificate of Incorporation of the American Law Institute, Dist. Colum. Feb. 23, 1923, 
reprinted in, e.g., 1992 ALI Annual Report 61. For discussions of the American Law Institute 
generally, see, e.g., N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins 
of the American Law Institute, 8 L. & Hist. Rev. 56 (1990) and the sources cited therein. 
64 To date, the ALI has produced three Tentative Drafts of the Restatement of Unfair Com-
petition. Tentative Draft No.1, (April 12, 1988), Tentative Draft No.2, (March 23, 1990), 
Tentative Draft No.3, (March 22, 1991). The full membership of the ALI is expected to consider 
the fourth and final Tentative Draft at the ALI's annual meeting in 1993. 
For general discussion of the Restatement of Unfair Competition, see Perlman, Harvey S., The 
Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition: A Work in Progress, 80 ~rademark Rep. 461 
(1990) (hereinafter "Perlman"); and Edelman, Sandra, Restatement of the Law of Trademarks: 
A Review, 81 Trademark Rep. 554 (1991) (hereinafter "Edelman"). 
65 See, e.g., Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463 ("The selection of those cases to restate and 
the synthesis of disparate decisions gives some leeway at the margin to influence rather than to 
merely report the state of the law. Although the Reporters have considerable discretion in for-
mulating drafts, the process functions, nonetheless, to keep the Restatements close to, but not 
always within, the mainstream of judicial decisions. "). 
Examples of such choices include the ALI's decision not to adopt the "New York Rule" with 
regard to the need to prove secondary meaning, see Restatement of Unfair Competition, § 13 
(Tentative Draft No.2), and the decision to include fair use as a separate defense to infringement. 
See id. at § 28 (Tentative Draft No.3). See generally, Edelman, 81 Trademark Rep. 554. 
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tween alternatives whose consequences are known.66 Instead, we are 
speculating about the consequences of legal rules that we have yet to 
apply.67 
Second, the ALI is a private organization.68 Its Restatements are 
consequently works of private authorship.69 They have no official 
status, even after the full membership of the ALI approves of them. 
Thus, while an individual court may find a Restatement persuasive 
on a given point, every court is free to reject all or a part of a 
Restatement's assertions about the law. 
The Patent Harmonization Treaty, in contrast, is being designed 
to have an official status. Once the treaty is signed and ratified, the 
United States will be required to enact legislation that will change its 
66 It is true that many of the legal rules in the current text of the Patent Harmonization Treaty 
that would be new to the United States nevertheless find precedent individually in the patent 
systems of various foreign countries. The treaty, however, sets forth a "hybrid" patent system 
comprised of rules borrowed from various national patent systems. It is almost certainly true, 
therefore, that the assemblage of legal rules set forth in the treaty has never before governed the 
patent system of any single country. As a result, the manner, if any, in which the rules interrelate 
is largely unexplored. 
More fundamentally, the use of foreign patent-law precedents as a basis for lawmaking in this 
country necessarily raises all the uncertainties of the sociological and psychological components 
of law have been discussed widely in connection with comparative law generally. See, e.g., 
Zweigert and Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 8-12 (1987); Grossfeld, The Strength and 
Weakness of Comparative Law, 71-74 (1990); Volkman-Schluck, Thomas, Continental European 
Criminal Procedures: True or Illusory Model?, 9 Am. J. Crim. L. 1,3-6 (1981); Yntema, Hessel, 
Comparative Law and Humanism, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 493 (1958); Pound, Roscoe, Comparative 
Law in Space and Time, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 70 (1955). It would be almost necessarily false, for 
example, to describe all the differences in inventive activity between countries as effects of the 
countries' respective patent systems. Cf., e.g., Helfgott, S., Cultural Differences Between the 
U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems, 72 JPTOS 231 (1990); Rines, R., Some Areas of Basic 
Difference Between United States Patent Law and the Rest That of the Rest of the World-And 
Why, 28 Idea, 5 (1987). Once this is admitted, identifying specific cause-and-effect relationships 
in foreign patent systems and evaluating whether those relationships would apply to the United 
States becomes extremely problematic. 
67 See, e.g., Patent Study No.5, at 5 ("We plunge into this analysis [of the proper rules for 
an international patent system] with one major misgiving. Policy toward the international patent 
system turns heavily on an appraisal of its economic impact, and much of the data needed in 
order to consider this impact objectively is lacking or inadequate. Although information exists 
with respect to the system, its value is limited either because of its subjective and impressionistic 
nature or because of the unrepresentative character of the situations that it covers. The generali-
zations of businessmen based upon their personal experiences; the isolated illustrations acciden-
tally brought to light in one context or another; ... , though valuable, are too limited to test the 
validity of broad generalizations. "). 
68 See, e.g., the Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws of the American Law Institute, 
reprinted in, e.g., 1990 ALI Annual Report, 61, 63. 
69 See generally, e.g., David, Rene, Major Legal Systems of the World Today, 404-06 (2d 
ed. 1978). 
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law of patents to conform to the treaty's provisions.70 Even before 
that time, once the treaty is finalized by WIPO its terms will be 
inalterable-the choice will be either to ratify or to reject the treaty 
as a whole. There will be no 'means of changing individual provisions 
that are viewed as troublesome. 
Both of these fundamental differences suggest that the United 
States should be using even greater care to negotiate the Patent Har-
monization Treaty than the ALI has used to p~epare its Restatement. 
Because the task of patent harmonization involves creating new law, 
it is by necessity much more uncertain and prone to error. At the 
same time, the negative consequences of our failing to select the 
proper rules are potentially much greater. We will not be allowed to 
ignore any improvident selections of law. Instead, our guesswork 
concerning an optimal patent system will be cast in the stone of a 
binding multilateral agreement. Correcting our mistakes will not be 
a matter of domestic legislation only. Rather, it will require us to 
undertake the difficult and uncertain task of developing a consensus 
in the international community. 71 
Despite these suggestions, there are disturbing indications that 
we have approached the WIPO negotiations with significantly less 
care than the ALI gives a typical effort at restatement. The ALI 
succinctly describes its procedure for arriving at a Restatement of the 
Law on the inside front cover of each each of its Tentative Drafts: 
Each portion of an Institute Project [including Restatement efforts] is submitted 
initially for review to the Project's Consultants or Advisers as a Memorandum, 
Preliminary Draft, or Advisory Group Draft. As revised, it is then submitted to 
the council of the Institute in the form of a Council Draft. After review by the 
Council, it is submitted as a Tentative Draft, Discussion Draft, or Proposed Official 
Draft for consideration by the membership at the Institute's Annual Meeting. At 
70 In general, under United States law treaties are either self.enforcing or require the passage 
of enabling legislation to be given effect. The Paris Convention has been held to be not self-
enforcing. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913). In its present form the 
Patent Harmonization Treaty would appear to require the passage of enabling legislation. 
71 See, e.g., David, Rene, The International Unification of Private Law, 2 International En-
cyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5 at 120·22 ("Periodic revision [of international uniform· 
law agreements] is likely to remain a matter of theory if it requires calling a special international 
conference, as it is only with much difficulty and reluctance that the slow and costly machinery 
of such conferences is put into motion, and there can be no question of using it to deal with minor 
difficulties. "). The Paris Convention, for example, has been revised on only seven occasions 
since its origination in 1883. 
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each stage of the reviewing process, ~ Draft may be referred back for revision and 
resubmission.72 
Under the ALI's procedures, then, four separate bodies review 
each Restatement. The project is initially entrusted to a small number 
of persons, known as Reporters, who conduct the original research.73 
The Reporters also write the initial version of the Restatement, which 
is called a Preliminary Draft.74 The Reporters then submit the Pre-
liminary Draft simultaneously to two separate bodies: the Advisors 
and the Members Consultative Group. The Advisors are individuals 
"with substantial expertise and authority" in the particular field under 
consideration who the ALI selects to assist the Reporters.75 They are 
often not members of the ALI. The Members Consultative Group 
consists of members of the ALI who have indicated an interest in the 
particular restatement project. 76 After receiving input from these two 
groups, the Reporters prepare a Council Draft, which they submit to 
the Council of the ALI. 77 If authorized by the Council, the Reporters 
then prepare a Tentative Draft, which the general membership con-
siders and votes upon at the ALI's annual meetings.78 The project 
does not become a true Restatement of the ALI until the general 
membership votes its approval. 79 
72 E.g., Tentative Draft No.1. Accord, Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 462-463. The ALI's 
Rules of the Council (hereinafter "Council Rules") describe aspects of the process at sections V 
and VI. See, e.g., 1992 ALI Annual Report at 68, 73-74. The ALI's process of arriving at its 
restatements is also discussed generally in Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a 
Pennanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an 
American Law Institute, 1 ALI Proceedings, part I, at 48-56 (1923) (hereinafter "Report on the 
Establishment of the ALl''). 
73 E.g., Council Rule V. 1 ("Each project of the Institute shall be in charge of a reporter or 
reporters employed by the Director [of the ALI] with the approval of the Council or the Executive 
Committee. "). 
74 Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 462. 
75Id. 
76 See id. 
77 See ALI Council Rule VI.1 ("Material intended for publication shall first be submitted to 
the Council .... "); Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463. 
The Council of the ALI functions approximately as the ALI's board of directors. See ALI 
Bylaws, at 111.1, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 65. It is a group of about forty-two members elected 
from the general membership. ALI Bylaws, at 111.2, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 65. 
78 E.g., Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463. The ALI publishes transcripts of these debates 
in its serial set, ALI Proceedings. 
79 See, e.g., ALI Bylaws, V.1, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 66 ("No restatement ..• shall 
be published as representing the position of the Institute unless authorized by the membership of 
the Institute and approved by the Council. "). 
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The process of arriving at the Patent Harmonization Treaty has 
been quite different. 80 The International Bureau of WIPO prepared 
the draft texts of the treaty and the accompanying regulations, as well 
as the reports pertaining thereto.81 In that sense, it has functioned 
similarly to the Reporters of a Restatement. The International Bureau, 
however, has presented those drafts for review to one body only -
the Committee of Experts.82 The process of arriving at the Patent 
Harmonization Treaty has therefore lacked the sort of multi-tiered 
review to which the ALI subjects its restatement efforts. One can 
suspect, then, that the Patent Harmonization Treaty has not been 
subjected to as rigorous or as varied a review as might have been the 
case otherwise . 
. The characteristics of the parties that have been involved in the 
WIPO negotiations also give rise to concerns. For example, the ALI 
typically appoints as Reporters United States lawyers, and the Res-
tatements attempt to describe only the law that is appropriate for this 
country. The International Bureau of WIPO, in contrast, is a contin-
uation of the former United International Bureau for the Protection 
of Industrial, Literary and Artistic Property, which was known under 
its French acronym of BIRPI.83 While not necessarily hostile to United 
States interests, it is not concerned per se with promoting the national 
80 WlPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, presents a summary of the process of arriving 
at the Patent Harmonization Treaty. For general descriptions of WIPO's processes for negotiating 
the Patent Harmonization Treaty, see Fryer III, 72 JPTOS at 244-47; Remarks of Ludwig Baeumer 
at the AIPLA Spring-Stated Meeting (May 2, 1991) 1991 AIPLA Bull. 630-33 (July-Sept.). 
81 WlPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, at par. 15. 
82 See generally id. Strictly speaking, the final meeting before WIPO was a diplomatic con-
ference of the Paris Union, and not a meeting of the Committee of Experts. See supra, n.4. The 
identity of the persons who participated on behalf of United States interests did not change 
substantially, however, see infra, nn.86-103, and so the diplomatic conference cannot be consid-
ered a separate level of review. 
83 See, e.g., Report on the Work of Main Committee V, at 126. For discussions of WIPO 
generally, see, e.g., Ulmer, 14 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 1, at 10; 
David, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5, at 173-74. 
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interests of any country in particular. 84 It seems safe to assume that 
the International Bureau did not draft the Patent Harmonization Treaty 
with the goal of creating legal rules that would be optimal specifically 
for the United States.85 By default, then, the task of ensuring that the 
terms of the treaty are appropriate for the United States has fallen on 
a single group of persons - those persons who have attended the 
WIPO meetings either as members of an official delegation of the 
United States or a private organization with a primarily United-States 
character.86 
There are disturbing implications that this group of U.S. experts87 
has been significantly less qualified to be law-makers than the various 
ALI groups have been. It is axiomatic, in a society that values rep-
resentative decisionmaking, that the legitimacy of a lawmaking effort 
84 Article 3 of the WlPO Convention, for example, states: 
Objectives or the Organization 
The objectives of the Organization are: 
(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among states 
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organization, 
(ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among the [Paris and Berne] Unions. 
Leaffer, at 567. Given this mandate, WIPO's interests may be generally adverse to the purely 
national interests of any country, to the extent that those national interests do not coincide with 
a free-trade approach to protecting intellectual property. Cf. Penrose, at 109 ("The potential costs 
and gains associated with an international extension of the patent system will be evaluated dif-
ferently by countries in different economic positions, and still differently if one looks at them 
from the point of view of the world as a whole. "). 
85 In contrast, "a reporter [of the AU] ... must stand out to the country as generally rec-
ognized among members of the legal profession as having profound knowledge of [the] subject 
[under consideration]." William Draper Lewis, Remarks at the Opening Session of the AU, 
reprinted in Account of the Proceedings of the Organization of the Institute on February 23, 
1923, 1 AU Proceedings, pt. II, at 60 (1923) (hereinafter "Remarks of William Lewis"). The 
national focus of the work of the AU's reporters is necessarily implicit in the AU's lawmaking 
efforts. 
86 The Notes in Industrial Property, supra, n.4, list the persons who attended each meeting of 
experts. WlPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, summarizes the participation by organiza-
tions in the meetings. The organizations represented at the WIPO negotiations that this article 
considers to have "a primarily United States character" are the American Bar Association (ABA), 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the Center for Advanced Study 
and Research on Intellectual Property (CASRIP), Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. (IPO), and 
the New York Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Association (NYPTCLA). The large ma-
jority of the persons who attended the WI PO meetings did not represent United States interests. 
87 Readers should be aware that this article uses the term "U.S. expert" differently than does 
WIPO. WI PO uses the term to refer only to those persons who have attended as members of an 
official delegation of the U.S. Government. Although mechanisms do exist for including private 
individuals in the official negotiating delegations of the United States, see Public Notice No. 655, 
44 Fed. Reg. 17846 (March 23, 1979), the PTO has generally not used this mechanism to 
supplement the official delegations of the United States to the various WI PO meetings. See infra, 
n.103. The PTO is believed to have largely foregone use of this mechanism in the general hope 
that concerned individuals and groups would attend the WIPO meetings independently. 
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depends at least in part on how widespread the participation in that 
effort has been.88 The founders of the ALI recognized this explic-
itly.89 As a result, the ALI includes members of diverse elements of 
the legal profession within the various bodies that review its Res-
tatement efforts. 
The ALI's effort to create the Restatement of Unfair Competition 
illustrates this commitment. The ALI commissioned the creation of 
the Restatement of Unfair Competition in 1981.90 It selected as Re-
porter for the project Robert Denicola, Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska.91 In addition, the ALI designated 19 persons to 
act as Advisers to the effort.92 That group included not only leading 
members of the practicing bar knowledgeable in the field of unfair 
competition,93 but also seven law school professors prominent in the 
area.94 In addition, it included Judges Newman and Oakes of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and then-
Judge, now Chief Judge Nies of the Federal Circuit. An additional 
37 lawyers, judges and academics formed the effort's Members Con-
sultative Group.95 The Council of the ALI consists of approximately 
50 persons,96 while the ALI itself has approximately 2,500 mem-
bern.~ . 
The U.S. experts who have appeared before WIPO, in contrast, 
have been far less representative. A very large majority of those 
persons have been either employees of the PTO or patent attorneys 
practising in corporations or large private law firms. Only three have 
88 See, e.g., the sources cited supra, n.62. 
89 See, e.g., Report on the Establishment of the ALI, 1 ALI Proceedings, part I, at 29-40 
("[A]ny restatement of the law to acquire authority necessary to enable it to accomplish results 
of importance, must be undertaken by an organization representative of all branches of the legal 
profession ...• No existing legal organization has the[se] characteristics ... "). 
90 E.g., Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 464; Edelman, 81 Trademark Rep. at 554. 
91 Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 464. 
92 Tentative Draft No.1. 
93 Included, for example, were Jerome Gilson, author of the multiple·volume treatise Trade-
mark Protection and Practice (1992), and William M. Borchard, author of Trademarks and the 
Arts (1989). 
94 They were, in alphabetical order, Ralph S. Brown, Yale Law School; Benjamin Kaplan, 
Harvard University Law School; Edmund Kitch, University of Virginia School of Law; David 
Lange, Duke University School of Law, J. Thomas McCarthy, University of San Francisco Law 
School; Harvey S. Perlman, Nebraska College of Law; and Charles Alan Wright, University of 
Texas School of Law. 
95 Tentative Draft No. 1. 
96 Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463. 
97 ALI Bylaws 11.2, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 63. 
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been academics.98 Not one has been a member of the Judiciary. In 
fact, a combined total of only fifty-five U.S. experts of any sort have 
participated in the twelve WIPO meetings.99 
One can also wonder how effective these experts have been. 
Common sense suggests that a person will be of more assistance to 
a lawmaking effort if his or her participation in the effort has been 
consistent. loo Stated negatively, a person's ability to affect the out-
come of the effort should be smaller if that person's participation has 
been limited. Where the subject matter under consideration is com-
plex, and therefore more difficult to grasp, the correlation should be 
stronger. 
The ALI effort appears to fare well by this criterion. By March 
22, 1991, when the ALI issued Tentative Draft No.3 of the Res-
tatement, the number of Advisors to the project had grown to 25 and 
the number of Consultative Members had grown to 106.101 More 
significantly, not a single one of the original Advisors had left the 
98 Donald Chisum, Professor, University of Washington; Albert Tramposch, Associate Pro-
fessor, John Marshall Law School; William Hennessey, Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center. 
William Fryer III, Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law, is reported to have attended 
4 WIPO meetings, but as a representative of an international interest group rather than one with 
a primarily United-States focus. 
99 These statistics and those in the immediately following discussion have been compiled from 
the Notes published in Industrial Property. See supra, nA. 
It appears, in addition, that meaningful participation in the WlPO negotiations has not extended 
very far beyond this small group. WIPO's Committee of Experts met from July 1985 to November 
1990 at an average of once every five months. See Kirk, 50 Albany L.J. at 605 (describing WI PO 
as "pushing" the harmonization negotiations "on a fast track"). The Committee appears to have 
set the topics for each meeting no earlier than the preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Third 
Session, 1997 Indus. Prop. at 207-08; Note on the Fourth Session, 1988 Indus. Prop. at 183, 
185-186; Note on the Second Part of the Fifth Session, 1989 Indus. Prop. at 59-60, 62. WIPO's 
International Bureau, moreover, which acted as Secretariat at the negotiations, often did not 
publish summaries of meetings for 2-3 months. See generally the Notes of the WI PO meetings 
published in Industrial Property, cited supra, nA. It therefore would have been extremely difficult, 
if not outright impossible, for the United States interest groups to formulate any consensus on 
the relevant issues in time for each meeting, or even to meaningfully inform their constituencies. 
See, e.g., Minutes of the 1991 Midwinter Meeting of the Council of the ABA Section of Patent, 
Trademark and Copyright Law, ABA-PTC, 1990-91 Annual Report, 23, 25 (reporting statement 
by William Brunet that the short time period between WlPO's issuance of the draft treaty and 
the scheduled beginning of the diplomatic conference "presents a timing problem"); Fryer III, 
72 JPTOS at 246 (noting lack of time to prepare for WlPO meeting and need for interest groups 
to act" immediately"). It appears, in fact, that the International Bureau of WIPO at times placed 
items on the agenda for a meeting and issued explanatory reports only after the conclusion of the 
last preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Second Session, 1986 Indus. Prop. at 311; 
100 See, e.g., Statement of William Lewis, 1 ALI Proceedings, part II, at 60-61 (emphasizing 
need for "systematic and regular attendance" by participants in ALI restatement efforts). 
101 Tentative Draft No.3. 
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effort; all of the original members were still present. 102 Reports in-
dicate that the attendance of individual Advisors at the ALI's meet-
ings was extremely regular. Meetings reportedly drew over 80% 
~ttendance, and a majority of the Advisors have attended every meet-
mg. 
The attendance <;>f individual U.S. experts at the WIPO negoti-
ations, in contrast, has been sporadic rather-than regular. On average, 
only 12.7 U.S. experts were present at each WIPO meeting. Thus, 
the average representative of United States interests attended only 2.8 
of the 12 WIPO meetings. The pattern is even more pronounced when 
the participation of employees of the PTO are excluded from the 
calculations. 103 Forty-one such non-PTO experts have attended the 
WIPO meetings,I04 thus presenting an average attendance of only 8.4 
experts per meeting and 2.5 meetings per expert. !Os No single U.S. 
expert, whether associated with the PTO or not, is reported to have 
attended all the WIPO meetings. In fact, all but seven U.S. experts 
~re reported to have each attended less than half of the WIPO meet-
mgs. 
All of this raises important questions about the WIPO negotia-
tions. As a group, for example, our representatives may have been 
102 One Advisor, Professor Perlman, was named a second Reporter and therefore relinquished 
his assignment as an Advisor. 
103 The statistics reported in the text at this point assume that all members of the official 
delegations of the United States to the various meetings of the Committee of Experts were 
employees of the PTO. This is not entirely correct. Reportedly, some of the persons who attended 
as part of these official delegations were not PTO employees. Statement of Manbeck, supra, n.4 
(asserting that private sector representatives and two congressional staff members were included 
in official delegations of the United States). The PTO, however, is not known to have published 
statements detailing the identity of the various participants in the delegations. See supra, n.87. 
The Notes in Industrial Property identify the participants at each meeting of the Committee of 
Experts by name, but not title. The Note concerning the Diplomatic Conference does identify the 
attendees by title, and so it has been possible to separate the PTO and non-PTO employees in 
that group individually. 
In any event, the significance of this difficulty appears to be minimal, as five PTO employees 
were responsible for a strong majority of appearances in the official delegations. (Of the 51 total 
official appearances at the meetings that are not known to involve non-PTO employees, 36 
appearances, or 71 %, were attributable to these five employees.) 
104 This tabulation does not include the attendance of the Honorable Harry Manbeck, who 
attended one WlPO meeting as a private expert before being appointed Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks. Thereafter, he is reported to have attended two additional meetings in his capacity 
as Commissioner. 
105 Fourteen PTO experts appeared a total of 51 times, yielding an average attendance of 4.3 
PTO experts per meeting and 3.6 meetings per PTO expert. 
In fact, the actual attendance rates may be even more disparate, as the non-PTO experts from 
the United States are reported to have seldom attended entire meetings. Fryer III, 72 JPTOS at 
244. 
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too alike to bring a varied expertise to bear. One can legitimately 
wonder, moreover, whether they have attended consistently enough 
to be effective. In short, the Patent Harmonization Treaty may not 
be the work of the most qualified set of lawmakers we might have 
provided. 
Additionally, it is entirely possible that optimizing our patent 
system requires more than balancing the needs of corporations, the 
PTO, and patent attorneys from large law firms.106 Laws derive their 
authority from a consensus among all members of society. Yet, only 
limited constituencies have participated before WIPO. 107 The WIPO 
negotiations may therefore be exceeding the consensus in this country 
that actually exists concerning harmonization, rendering the effort 
socially invalid. 108 
III. LEGISLATING HARMONIZATION 
Congress' recent introduction of legislation 109 may open the process 
of patent harmonization and alleviate some of these difficulties. Through 
hearings and other input, a wider range of persons may be able to 
participate in the law-making effort. The proceedings will also be 
more widely available to the United States public, thus making the 
process more visible in this country. Perhaps most importantly, the 
issues are now clearly in the hands of accountable decisionmakers. 
This same step, however, may have exacerbated concerns over 
another fundamental aspect of harmonization. Congress' introduction 
106 See, e.g., Penrose, at 115 (describing as "defective" the use of "opinions of business 
men, patent agents, and other interested persons" as the basis for determining optimal protection 
of foreign patentees). Arguably, since the country as a whole provides the increased wealth that 
patents transfer to their owners, see supra, n.28, considering only the interests of patent holders 
is necessarily incomplete. As another example, large users of the patent system may stand to 
receive disproportionately larger benefits from some proposed provisions of the Patent Harmo-
nization Treaty than will the country as a whole. See, e.g., infra, n.51 (discussing grace period 
as example). 
107 At the very least, the pattern of participation by U.S. experts in the WIPO negotiations 
suggests that the PTO has had a large, if not dominant, role in representing U.S. interests there. 
See Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AlP LA Bull., at 442-43 (noting lack of input to the PTO from other 
sources prior to the diplomatic conference). The PTO, however, is itself an agency with inherently 
limited perspective and expertise. See generally Moy, Judicial Deference to the PTO's Interpre-
tations of the Patent Law, 74 JPTOS 406, 426-35 (1992) and sources cited therein. It may be 
particularly unwise to rely upon that agency's judgments as to how the interests of the United 
States should be best protected. The PTO itself seems to appreciate this implicit limitation on its 
negotiating authority. Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AIPLA Bull. at 442-43. 
108 The recent difficulties of the European Community with ratification of the Treaty of 
Maastricht may provide another example of a treaty negotiation whose course has exceeded its 
underlying social mandate. See infra, n.138. 
109 See supra, n.6. 
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of legislation has cemented the harmonization lawmaking effort in 
this country into a legislative, civil-law model and away from the 
model of common-law development. As presently contemplated, a 
harmonized set of United States patent laws will be created all at 
once, simultaneously, through essentially a single lawmaking effort. 
The difficulty with this is that the United States has never before 
used such a mechanism to design its patent laws. Practically every 
major facet of United States patent law was developed with the aid 
of significant common-law input. For example, sections 102(a) , llO 
102( e), 11l 102(g) , 112 103,113 and 104114 of Title 35 all essentially 
repeat legal rules whose contours were each originally explored through 
a series of case-law decisions over an extended period of time. Even 
the 1952 Patent Act1l5 was largely an effort to restate, rather than 
recreate, the law of patents as it then existed. 116 Some important legal 
110 The text of section 102(a) appears supra, n.23. Related case decisions include Pennock v. 
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829); and Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477 (1850). See generally 1 Chisum, 
Patents § 3.05. The early history of the novelty requirement stretches back to the colonial period 
and early European practice. See generally Bugbee. 
111 Section 102(e) provides: 
§ 1112. Conditlens for patentability; novelty and loss or right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a 
patent unless· 
(e) the invention was first described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the 
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent. or on an international application by 
another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2). and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before 
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent[.) 
The prior caselaw decisions include Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 
U.S. 390 (1926), and Hazeltine v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965). 
112 The text of section 102(g) appears supra, n.25. Related caselaw decisions include Bedford 
v. Hunt, 3 Fed. Cas. 37 (C.C.Mass. 1817) and Sydeman vs. Thoma, 141 O.G. 866; 32 App. 
D.C. 362 (D.C. Ct. App. 1909). This area of the law can still be said to be under substantial 
development by caselaw. See, e.g., Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
113 The first paragraph of section 103 reads as follows: 
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvlous subject·malter 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in 
section 102 of this title. if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of 
ordinal)' skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner 
in which the invention was made. 
Related court decisions include Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 258 (1851). See generally 
Kitch, E., Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 S.Ct. Rev. 293. 
114 See supra, nn.25, 27. 
115 Act of July 19, 1952, Ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792. 
116 See generally Federico, P.J., Commentary on the New Patent Act, at 6-10, reprinted in 
Title 35, U.S.C.A. (1954 ed.). 
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rules, such as the Doctrine of Equivalents,117 have never even been 
codified at all. 
Viewed historically, then, those who favor harmonization thus 
have taken upon themselves an enormous and unprecedented task: 
the instantaneous recreation of the U.S. patent system. Harmonization 
on the scale now being contemplated118 will require us to discern and 
address a host of intricate, specific rules of substantive patent law. 
For example, would removing the territorial restrictions of Sections 
102(g) and 104 also require us to delete the territorial restrictions in 
Sections 102(a) and 102(b)?119 What will be the resulting effect of 
considering oral and public~use disclosures in foreign countries to be 
prior art?120 What will be the impact of disregarding private offers 
for sale in determining novelty?121 Do the economic arguments in 
favor of considering "secret" activities to be prior art outweigh the 
Europeans' desire to retain their current practice?122 Can harmoni~ 
zation occur when the various countries that are part of the effort use 
radically different claiming theories in their national patent prac~ 
117 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); and 
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates, 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
118 It may be worthwhile to note that the WIPO harmonization effort originated from other 
projects with much more modest goals than the far-reaching attempt at harmonization that is now 
embodied in the Patent Harmonization Treaty. According to WIPO, it grew out of a relatively 
simple effort to obtain an international agreement to include a grace period in national patent 
laws. WIPO History, WI PO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, at par. 2-3. Officials of the PTO have asserted 
that it grew out of an effort to coordinate the operations of the patent offices of the United States, 
Japan, and Europe. See, e.g., Kirk, 50 Albany L. Rev. at 602. 
119 See supra, n.25. 
120 Resolution 102-8 of the ABA-PTC, reprinted in ABA-PTC, 1990-91 Annual Report, at 
43, opposes the consideration of "non-patented and non-published foreign disclosures as prior 
art." 
121 Under Article 11 of the Patent Harmonization Treaty, Basic Proposal, WIPO Doc. No. 
PLT/DC/3 at 21, confidential offers to sell would not destroy novelty. Report of William J. 
Brunet, Chair, Committee 102 (International Patent Treaties and Laws) to the Council of the 
ABA-PTC, Jan. 20, 1991, reprinted in ABA-PTC, 1990-91 Annual Report, 27. Resolution 102-
7 of the ABA-PTC, reprinted in id. at 43, would oppose such a change. 
122 An upcoming work by the present author will address the economic considerations involved 
in the treatment of "secret" events as prior art. 
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tices?123 Is harmonization even a realistic outcome from a treaty that 
addresses only substantive patent law, and not the differing litigation 
and discovery practices of the various countries?124 Given our his-
torical use of common-law methods to develop consensus in patent 
law, we may simply be unable as a society to act properly on the 
specifics of harmonization via legislative mechanisms. 
Recent evidence shows how difficult such action may be. One 
of the most recent legislative lawmaking efforts in United States 
patent law enhanced process-patent protection via the Patent Law 
Amendments of 1988.125 Even this limited law-making action pro-
duced a set of provisions that are hugely complex, contradictory, and 
largely ineffective. Another recent legislative effort partially over-
turned In re Bass126 via the Patent Law Amendments of 1984.127 That 
effort inserted into Section 103 a second paragraph that excludes from 
the definition of "prior art" certain activities falling within the cri-
123 National patent claiming practices generally are classified as either "central" or "periph-
eral." The United States' claiming practice is peripheral. See generally, e.g., Deller, A.W., 
Patent Claims, §§ 5-10 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1992) (hereinafter "Deller on Patent Claims"). 
Other countries, however, use central claiming practice to a greater degree than does the United 
States. See, e.g., Tanabe & Wegner, Japanese Patent Law, pt. I, 58 JPOS 565 (1976). ct. 
Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, 
reprinted in Leaffer, at 169 (attempting to standardize European claiming practice as between 
extreme peripheral and central theories). The choice of claiming theory impacts the operation of 
various other legal doctrines of patent law, notably the doctrine of equivalents. E.g., Deller on 
Patent Claims, at §§ 11-12; Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Detennine 
Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 Rutgers Comp. & 
Tech. L.J. 1 (1992). 
124 Article 2(3) of the Paris Convention expressly reserves "[t)he provisions of the laws of 
each countries of the Union relating to judicial and administrative procedure and to jurisdiction," 
Leaffer, at 21, and the Patent Harmonization Treaty contains no express provisions on such 
subjects. The practice in foreign countries regarding these matters, such as for example civil 
discovery practice, can be quite different from that in the United States. E.g., Kaplan, von Mehren 
& Schaefer, Phases of Gennan Civil Procedure, pt. I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1246-47 (1958) 
(discussing German civil discovery). The proposal of the United States in the now-stalled GAIT 
negotiations did contain provisions relating to minimum discovery mechanisms in member coun-
tries. See Richards, 72 JPTOS at 921. 
125 Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 418, 102 Stat. 1563, 1564·6, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). See generally, Law, Glenn, Note: Liability Under the Process Patent 
Amendments Act of 1988 for the Use of the Patented Process Outside the United States, 60 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 245 (1991). 
126 474 F.2d 1276 (CCPA 1973). Other related decisions are In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029 
(CCPA 1980), and Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
127 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 622, § 103,98 Stat. 3383, 3384, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
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teria of Sections 102(f) and 102(g).I28 In an omission that is concep-
tually unsound, however, the new paragraph makes no mention of 
activities defined by Section 102(e).129 Another series of recent leg-
islative efforts created the provisions in Title 35 that pertain to the 
extension of the terms of certain patents. 130 The Federal Circuit has 
already found them to have created a "windfall" for a particular 
class of patent owners "that was probably not contemplated by Con-
gress. "131 In addition, the Supreme Court has already been called 
upon to address an ambiguity in their language. 132 
On the whole, then, recent experience does not speak well of 
our ability to legislate rules of patent law. Observers can therefore 
be rightfully uncomfortable with efforts to make numerous, funda-
mental changes in the patent system of the United States rapidly via 
legislation. 133 
The prior experiences of other countries with patent-law har-
monization, moreover, may not be a source of comfort to the United 
States. The most extensive experiment in patent-law harmonization 
to date has occurred in Western Europe, where a series of conventions 
have required member nations of the European Community to adopt 
128 That paragraph provides: 
§ 103 Conditions Cor patentability; non-obvlous subject matter 
Subject mailer developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (I) or (g) of 
section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject mailer and the 
claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subjcctto an obligation 
of assignment to the same person. 
129 See generally In re Bartleld, 925 F.2d 450 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The AIPLA has considered 
recommending that Congress amend the provision to include reference to section 102(e). Report 
of the Patent Law Committee at the 1990 AIPLA Midwinter Meeting, 1990 AIPLA Bull. 322 
(Jan.-Mar.). 
130 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 417, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Stat 1585 (1984), amended by the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, Pub. L. 670, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Stat. 3971 (1988). 
131 Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 529 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
132 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (addressing ambiguity in section 
271(e)(I». 
133 Professor Malchup, for example, made the following observations after concluding that 
the overall economic consequences of the patent system were too difficult to quantify: 
If one does not know whether a system "as a whole" (in contrast to certain features of it) is good or bad, 
the safest "policy conclusion" is to "muddle through" -either with it, if one has long lived with it, or without 
it, if one has long lived without it. 11 would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its 
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, 
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. 
Patent Study No. 15, at 80. The same cautious approach is arguably wisest in evaluating whether 
to join the current harmonization effort. 
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uniform patent laws.134 Nearly all these member countries, however, 
operate under systems of civil law .135 They therefore have profoundly 
different values and habits with regard to law-making mechanisms 
than we do - values and habits that are aligned to the mechanisms 
of the current harmonization effort much more closely than are OUTS. 136 
Legislating entire bodies of law at once is- for them the norm, not the 
exception as it is in United States patent law. 
Perhaps more importantly, the member nations of the EC have 
already made decisions in favor of internationalism that are much 
more fundamental and far-reaching than whether to harmonize their 
patent laws. They have broadly committed to the concept of free-
trade within a single, European market,137 and are adopting uniform 
134 Strassbourg Convention of 1963, reprinted in Jacob, app. CS (requiring the adoption of 
similar rules of substantive patent law); European Patent Convention, reprinted in Leaffer, at 143 
(creating single examination proceeding to obtain national patents in member countries); Com-
munity Patent Convention, reprinted in 1 Sweet & Maxwell, Encyclopedia of United Kingdom 
& European Patent Law, 5001 (1992) (not yet in force) (providing for single patent granting 
rights in all member countries). See generally, e.g., Paterson, G., The European Patent System, 
15-23 (1992) (hereinafter "Paterson"); Ulmer, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
ch. 1, at 36-38. 
135 Of the thirteen countries that are signatory to the EPC, for example, only the United 
Kingdom has a significant common law tradition. 
136 For a general comparative discussion of law-making mechanisms in civil-law jurisdictions, 
see, e.g., Dainow, Joseph, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 
15 Am. J. Comp. L. 419, 424 (1966-67) ("Generally, in civil law jurisdictions the main source 
or basis of the law is legislation, and large areas are codified in a systematic manner .... Although 
in the form of statutes duly enacted by the proper legislative procedure, these codes are quite 
different from ordinary statutes ..... A code is not a list of special rules for specific situations; 
it is, rather, a body of general principles carefully arranged and closely integrated .•.. A code 
purports to be comprehensive and to encompass the entire subject matter, not in the details but 
in the principles, and to provide answers for questions which may arise. "). 
137 Treaty on Establishing the European Economic Community, as signed at Rome, 1957 
(hereinafter the "Treaty of Rome"). The Treaty of Rome commits its members, for example, to 
allow goods, arts. 9-37, and persons, services and capital, arts. 48-70, to move freely between 
member countries. 
Some in Europe have expressly recognized the relationship between these broader trade agree-
ments and the harmonization of European patent laws. See, e.g., Paterson, at 16 (noting that, 
prior to the formation of the Strassbourg Convention, "the existence of separate national patents 
for the same invention was seen as a mechanism whereby trade barriers could be maintained, 
contrary to the newly emerging European interest in a common market"). 
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laws in many subject-matter areas outside of patent law. 138 The United 
States, in contrast, has essentially none of these relationships with 
the countries that are potential parties to the current harmonization 
treaty.139 There is room to wonder, therefore, what if any of the 
European experience with harmonization will apply to the United 
States under the current effort in WIPO. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I suggest that at least some of the current resistance to harmo-
nization is the result of two difficult, interrelated problems. The cur-
rent efforts at harmonization are based on internationalist policy goals 
that the United States has not embraced. To harmonize we will there-
fore have to make changes to the basic legal rules of our patent 
system. More importantly, responsible lawmaking would seem to 
require that the adoption of harmonized legal rules follow, and be 
dependent on, the prior formation of a new social consensus as to 
the nature of the patent system in this country. 
It is a serious question whether the current law-making processes 
of harmonization can create such a new consensus. The debate over 
harmonization needs to explicitly recognize the existence of much 
138 The Treaty of Rome commits its members to cooperate in many areas, such as economic 
and monetary policy, arts. 102A-116, and social policy. Arts. 117-19. 
It is interesting to note that the difficulties the Europeans are experiencing with deeper unifi-
cation bear similarities to the law-making difficulties that are under discussion here. The govern-
ments of the twelve nations of the EC have signed the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 
Treaty on European Union, as signed at Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992. The Maastricht Treaty would 
provide for measures of unity well beyond free trade, such as a common currency and common 
defense. Id. The voters of Denmark, however, have recently refused to ratify the Maastricht 
Treaty, and popular sentiment for the treaty is reported to be weak in many European countries. 
See, e.g., Roger Cohen, European Community Left Askew After Danes Say No to Integration, 
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1992, at AI; Craig Whitney, Denmark's Signal: A 'No' to Europe Points 
Up Anxieties on Sovereignty, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1992, at A6. According to Cohen, 
[m]uch of [the] criticism [of the treaty] surfaced only after the accord was reacheq in Maastricht. It appears that 
many of the European Community'S 340 million citizens were unaware of what was in the treaty and the degree 
to which it represented a radical step toward union. 
Certainly, many Danes complained before the vote, when the treaty was signed they had no idea what 
commitment their government was making. 
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1992, at A6. Accord, Make O'Break, The Economist 56 (June 13, 1992) 
(noting among Irish voters the "widespread belief that the whole Maastricht process is unde-
mocratic"); RatifICation, The Economist, 48 (June 20, 1992); Alan Riding, European Treaty 
Sponsors Have a Lot to Explain. 
139 The United States entered into its first free-trade agreement, with Canada, in 1988. It has 
recently finished negotiating the second such agreement, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, with Canada and Mexico. See, e.g., Bradsher, K., Economic Accord Reached by U.S., 
Mexico and Canada Lowering Trade Bamers, N.Y. Times, August 13, 1992. The NAFT A treaty 
has not yet been ratified, and its merits are subject to considerable debate within the United States. 
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broader, deeper questions than it yet has. More importantly, the very 
task of harmonizing United States patent law may be unsuited to 
multilateral treaty negotiations or other similar lawmaking mecha-
nisms. Patent law in the United States is complex and textured. Fun-
damentally redesigning it all at once may simply be beyond our abilities. 
We may be unable to acquire the necessary expertise to recognize 
the many issues that are involved. Even if we can, moreover, we 
may still be unable to agree on how each of those issues should be 
resolved. In short, it may be impossible to subject each of the sub-
stantive issues in the current harmonization effort to a properly fo-
cused analysis. 
